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In this paper we extend Nordhaus’ (1994) results to an environ-
ment which may represent the current European situation, charac-
terised by a single monetary authority and several ﬁscal bodies. We
show that: a) co-operation among national ﬁscal authorities is wel-
fare improving only if they also co-operate with the central bank; b)
when this condition is not satisﬁed, ﬁscal rules, as those envisaged
in the Maastricht Treaty and in the Stability and Growth Pact, may
work as co-ordination devices that improve welfare; c) the relation-
ship between several treasuries and a single central bank makes the
ﬁscal leadership solution collapse to the Nash one, so that, contrary
to Nordhaus (1994) and Dixit and Luisa Lambertini (2001), when
moving from the Nash to the Stackelberg solution, ﬁscal discipline no
longer obtains. Also in this case we thus argue in favour of ﬁscal rules
in a monetary union.
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11 Introduction1
In this paper we extend Nordhaus’ (1994) results to an environment which
may represent the current European situation, characterised by a single mon-
etary authority and several ﬁscal bodies. As a matter of fact, while in the
US context the game between the Treasury and the Fed may produce results
that are easily interpretable within the Nordhaus’ approach, such a model
needs to be modiﬁed in order to analyse the game between the ECB and
the diﬀerent national treasuries. The recent enlargement of the European
Union provides a further justiﬁcation for our analysis. We consider an open
economy and, in particular, the case of a two-country monetary union. Our
aim is to provide an analytical framework for the analysis of the monetary
and ﬁscal interactions implied by the clauses of the Maastricht Treaty and
of the Stability and Growth Pact.
The starting point is considering macroeconomic policy as conducted
through two instruments, monetary and ﬁscal policy, and deﬁned by three
objectives, price and ﬁscal stability, and full employment. We assume that
monetary and ﬁscal authorities, while sharing the same model of the econ-
omy, assign diﬀerent weights to their objectives: the former cares more about
inﬂation, while the latter is more concerned about unemployment.
Given this background, in this paper we make three distinct points: a) co-
operation among national ﬁscal authorities is welfare improving only if they
also co-operate with the central bank; b) when this condition is not satisﬁed,
ﬁscal rules, as those envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty and in the Stability
and Growth Pact, allow to reach a better outcome; c) the relationship be-
tween several treasuries and a single central bank makes the ﬁscal leadership
solution collapse to the Nash one, so that, contrary to Nordhaus (1994) and
Dixit and Luisa Lambertini (2001), ﬁscal discipline no longer obtains when
moving from the Nash to the Stackelberg solution. Also in this case we thus
conclude for the opportunity of ﬁscal rules in a monetary union.
The paper is organised as follows. First, we present a brief overview
of the literature (section 2). Then, the diﬀerent features of the strategic
relationship between monetary and ﬁscal authorities in the US and in the
EU are analysed (section 3). The model and its solutions are derived in
section 4, where we consider ﬁrst the mirror image countries case and then
the small country case. Some concluding remarks summarise and end our
analysis.
1We would like to thank the Conference participants at the Certosa di Pontignano
(Siena, Italy), University of Aveiro (Portugal), and University of Victoria B.C. (Canada)
for their useful comments and suggestions. Of course we are the only responsible for any
errors or omissions contained in the paper.
22 Review of the literature
Nordhaus (1994) considers the strategic relationship between a ﬁscal and a
monetary authority aiming at choosing optimally their respective instruments
in order to minimise their loss functions. When a Nash game is played, he
ﬁnds that the lack of co-operation is responsible for an ineﬃcient policy mix,
often observed in reality, resulting in an excessively restrictive monetary and
an excessively expansionary ﬁscal policy2.
The solution of a Stackelberg game (with the ﬁscal authority playing as
a leader, i.e. taking the central bank’s monetary rule into account) Pareto
dominates the Nash outcome3. This result is explained by the diﬀerence in
the objectives of the two authorities. The ﬁscal authority tries to ﬁght unem-
ployment by means of an expansionary policy, but the central bank reacts by
means of a contractionary monetary policy to keep inﬂation under control.
The outcome is a too expansionary ﬁscal policy in the Nash equilibrium.
When the ﬁscal authority plays the role of a Stackelberg leader4, it will act
in a less expansionary way, so as to allow the central bank to follow a more
relaxed policy5.
Several reasons, however, justify some skepticism about this result, so as
to support the imposition of ﬁscal rules. As a matter of fact, many authors
2The same conclusion is reached by Carraro, 1986 and Tabellini, 1987. Hughes Hallet
and Petit (1990) also underline the costs deriving from the lack of co-operation between
ﬁscal and monetary policy. They ﬁnd, however, that the ﬁscal expansion - monetary
restriction policy mix is eﬃcient, and results from a co-operative game in which the gov-
ernment dominates and the central bank is allowed the freedom to ﬁght inﬂation.
3Luca Lambertini and Rovelli (2002) show that the Stackelberg solution always Pareto
dominates the Nash one, independently of who is the leader of the game.
4Nordhaus (1994) deﬁnes such a case as characterised by a monetary rule, arguing that
the ﬁscal authority would be obliged to optimise its utility function, subject to the rules
strictly followed by an independent and conservative central bank.
5The Stackelberg solution, though being Pareto superior to the Nash one, is worse
than the co-operative one. As a matter of fact, co-operation between ﬁscal and monetary
authorities would allow to choose a solution included between their respective bliss points.
In opposition to this conclusion, however, Blinder (1983) ﬁnds co-ordination (for reasons
that will be explained later on, we would ﬁnd more appropriate to talk about co-operation)
between monetary and ﬁscal policy both diﬃcult to implement and not necessarily con-
ducive to superior outcomes. In his view, the possibility to block each other’s options
should be preserved, as made clear by the short example quoted in Carraro (1986). The
example refers to a car that is used to learn how to drive. While it would seem eﬃcient to
endow just one guide with brakes, there might be some situations in which the availability
of a second brake might turn out to be particularly useful. The example seems to reﬂect
particularly well the fact that, over the last twenty years, as we will further argue in the
next paragraph, the US have never followed both restrictive monetary and ﬁscal policies:
when ﬁscal policy was expansionary, monetary policy has been restrictive and vice-versa.
3would argue that governments always ﬁnd ways to inﬂuence the decisions
of a formally independent central bank. This inﬂuence may be either direct
(sheer political pressure) or indirect (appointment of board members), so that
discrepancies between constitutional (or statutory) and actual central bank
independence may arise (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1998; Cuckierman, 1994)6.
Moreover, even when independence is granted the central bank might not be
conservative enough to be able to commit to tight monetary policies that in
turn should induce ﬁscal discipline. This is why most institutional arrange-
ments not only include central bank independence but also conservativeness,
the former not necessarily implying the latter.
Central bank conservativeness, however, may still not be enough to induce
ﬁscal discipline. As a matter of fact, Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997), by
considering a model in which public debt enters the objective function of the
ﬁscal authorities, show that in the presence of political distortions (the ﬁscal
authority is myopic, i.e. it is more impatient than society) or opportunistic
behaviour (the ﬁscal authority cares less about inﬂation than society does,
and it does not care suﬃciently about debt stabilization), a conservative
central bank will not be capable to reduce the public debt bias. Moreover,
when considering a co-operative equilibrium, central bank conservativeness
might not be enough to guarantee ﬁscal discipline, as proved, among others,
by Van Aarle, Bovenberg and Raith (1995). They show that a conservative
central bank may exert a perverse eﬀect on the ﬁscal authority, since the
aggregate concern for debt stabilization gets reduced. The arguments above
provide, then, some clear justiﬁcations for the imposition of ﬁscal rules.
When considering a monetary union, characterised by a single central
bank and several national ﬁscal authorities, some further arguments justify
the introduction of ﬁscal rules, like those contained both in the Maastricht
Treaty and in the Stability and Growth Pact. Bovenberg, Kremers and Mas-
son (1991, quoted in Van Aarle, Bovenberg and Raith, 1997) describe several
channels through which monetary uniﬁcation can make ﬁscal policy more
expansionary. Both the cost of borrowing and the burden of public debt on
the domestic economy are not internalised since they are partially shifted to
other countries7. Country risk is removed, given the implicit insurance result-
6The presence of a high level of public debt provides an additional reason for running
expansionary monetary policies in order to reduce its burden (Beetsma and Bovenberg,
1997). Contrary to this conclusion, in Nordhaus’ model central bank independence is to
be blamed for public debt explosion.
7Aizenman, (1992 and 1993) shows that a monetary union with decentralised ﬁscal
decision making produces both an inﬂationary bias and excessive public spending (it should
be noted that in this case the ineﬃcient policy mix is made of expansionary monetary and
ﬁscal policies).
4ing from the participation to a currency union where economic and ﬁnancial
stability is a public good. In addition to that, the elimination of currency
risk encourages the residents of other countries to invest in government debt,
so that ﬁscal authorities can easily borrow on the international markets to
ﬁnance their expenditure. Moreover, since common monetary policy cannot
be used to face country-speciﬁc shocks, ﬁscal policy may have to do the job.
In other words, the disciplining market mechanism, that might work when a
ﬁscal authority faces its domestic central bank, fails (Papadia and Ruggiero,
1999). Similar considerations are made by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999),
in line with the ﬁndings of Chari and Kehoe (1998). In a closed economy,
when the credibility of the central bank is assumed to be a public good, in
the presence of a non credible central bank the ﬁscal authority restraints debt
accumulation in order to enhance the credibility of future monetary policies.
In a monetary union, however, the separate ﬁscal authorities may not fully
internalise the cost of the additional inﬂation resulting from the need to re-
duce the real value of the public debt, since part of these costs spills over
to other countries. In such a situation, the second best can be achieved by
supplementing the central bank with debt targets on the ﬁscal authorities,
so as to alleviate the free rider problem8.
Dixit (2001) and Dixit and Luisa Lambertini (2001, 2003a, 2003b) provide
an additional reason for the introduction of ﬁscal constraints in a monetary
union. Fiscal rules are useful precisely to make the central bank’s commit-
ment to low inﬂation credible9. They show that with monetary leadership
(i.e. when the monetary authority takes into account the ﬁscal authorities’ re-
action function), ﬁscal discretion may destroy monetary commitment. When
ﬁscal authorities do not care about monetary independence, ﬁscal policy will
keep being expansionary even in the presence of a restrictive monetary pol-
icy, so that monetary authorities end up acting in an expansionary way in
order to avoid a debt explosion. With ﬁscal leadership, on the other hand,
the ﬁscal authorities will take into account the monetary authority’s reaction
function, so that ﬁscal policy will become more moderate. This result is also
obtained, as we have seen, by Nordhaus (1994), when considering the game
between national monetary and ﬁscal authorities.
Van Aarle, Bovenberg and Raith (1997), by extending the model proposed
by Tabellini (1986), analyse the strategic game between domestic treasuries
and a central bank aiming at reducing public debt. Contrary to the results-
8In line with these results, Casella (1992), Alesina and Grilli (1993) and Bayoumi (1994)
show that the attractiveness of entering a currency union decreases with the number of
participants.
9Similar considerations have been made by Artis and Winkler (1998).
5mentioned above, they show that, when considering feedback strategies10,
debt stabilization happens more quickly with a common central bank than
with separate ones. The reason for such a conclusion is that any ﬁscal au-
thority participating to the monetary union knows that, if it does not adjust,
the central bank will not react to such an imbalance, since it will only re-
spond to a generalised higher public debt. In other words, in a monetary
union the ﬁscal authority of any single country has a weaker strategic po-
sition vis-` a-vis the central bank compared to the case in which it faces a
national central bank. Any national treasury caring about the size of public
debt, then, will reduce its ﬁscal deﬁcit. This eﬀect, however, vanishes as
soon as countries co-operate, since this situation replicates the one in which
a single treasury faces a single central bank. As long as governments fail to
co-operate, then, moving to a monetary union thus improves ﬁscal discipline
and monetary stability, thereby making the need for the imposition of ﬁscal
rules less stringent.11
In the model that we present we show on the one hand that when consid-
ering the ﬁscal authorities of two identical countries, co-operation between
them is welfare improving only if they also co-operate with the central bank
(a result which recalls the one obtained by Van Aarle, Bovenberg and Raith,
1997), and on the other hand that the smaller the single country is with
respect to the rest of the monetary union, the smaller its incentive to follow
ﬁscal discipline becomes, thus justifying the introduction of ﬁscal rules.
3 The strategic game between monetary and
ﬁscal authorities: United States versus Eu-
rope
The strategic relationship between monetary and ﬁscal authorities presents
diﬀerent features in the US and in Europe. As for the US case, it is easy
to verify that the Regan-Volcker years have been characterised by an ex-
pansionary ﬁscal policy associated with a strongly contractionary monetary
policy12. Moving to consider the Clinton Administration, and in particular
10When considering a dynamic game, while in the case of open loop strategies a player
takes the opponent’s action as given, in the case of a feedback (closed loop) strategy a
player takes into account the opponent’s reaction function.
11A similar conclusion is reached by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998).
12Kishan and Opiela (2000) show that the pre-Reagan/Bush and pre-Volcker/Greenspan
eras were characterized by a non co-operative game between monetary and ﬁscal policy
and that the Reagan/Bush and Volcker/Greenspan regimes were consistent, instead, with
a co-operative game in which ﬁscal policy dominates and monetary policy accommodates.
6the 1993 legislation aimed at reducing the US structural budget deﬁcit, it
is also easy to observe that the policy mix got reversed: a restrictive ﬁscal
policy was accompanied by a relatively expansionary monetary policy13. Ac-
cording to Nordhaus, 1994: “This ﬁscal package was a high-stake gamble that
productive investment would indeed rise and that the contractionary eﬀect
would be oﬀset either by monetary policy or by strong private investment
and consumption” (p. 140)14.
In particular, the Clinton Administration “hoped that the Fed, which is
formally independent of the administration, would endorse the plan’s general
characteristics and indicate that it would use expansionary monetary policy
to oﬀset the contractionary eﬀects of tax increases and spending cuts” (Blan-
chard, 1997, p. 199)15. In Blanchard’s view, ﬁnancial markets believed that
the Fed would indeed “oﬀer Bill Clinton easy money for a real swipe of the
budget deﬁcit” (The Financial Times, March 13, 1993, quoted in Blanchard,
1997, note 10, p. 199). In our view, the implementation of an expansionary
monetary policy clearly indicated the Fed’s willingness to help the Clinton
Administration in the reduction of the budget deﬁcit.
The present years seem to slightly modify these conclusions, but still
show the presence of a coordination between ﬁscal and monetary policies: in
a phase of economic diﬃculty determined by various reasons (the explosion
of the speculative bubble inﬂated by the perspectives of the ‘new economy’,
the 11th of September 2001 terrorist attack and the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq), the economic policy jointly conducted by the Fed and the Treasury
did not fail to show expansionary characteristics aimed at contrasting the
danger of recession and crisis.
The attempt to co-ordinate monetary and ﬁscal policy in order to check
for inﬂation while assuring an adequate output growth, is also common to
many OECD countries, where monetary tightening is typically accompanied
by ﬁscal relaxation (Hughes Hallet, 2001). The same was also true for Eu-
rope up to 199016. During the years preceding the EMU, however, such a
13Woodward (1995, quotation in Blanchard, 2003) provides an account of the ﬁrst two
years of the Clinton administration, suggesting reading the interaction between the Fed
and the US Treasury within the game theoretic approach described above.
14Even during the Clinton administration, however, according to Nordhaus (1994) the
policy mix was characterised by a not expansionary enough monetary policy (Stiglitz, 2001,
also underlines the sluggishness of the monetary authority in responding to the Clinton’s
Administration consolidation eﬀorts).
15It is rather clear that this point is also relevant when discussing the expansionary
eﬀects of ﬁscal contractions (the so-called anti-Keynesian eﬀects of ﬁscal policy): in other
words, the puzzling expansionary eﬀects of ﬁscal consolidation might well be explained by
the expansionary stance followed by the monetary authority.
16Also for the European case in the years before 1990, however, there are discording
7relationship became less strong, so that monetary policy only reacted in an
expansionary way to public debt rather than to public deﬁcit reductions (Eu-
ropean Economy, 2001, quoted in Hughes Hallet, 2001). The overall picture
did not change when EMU took over. The ECB is committed to pursue
price stability and to satisfy self-imposed monetary targets, while the ﬁs-
cal authorities have to abide by the rigid ﬁscal rules contained both in the
Maastricht Treaty and in the Stability and Growth Pact. In other words, a
strategic interaction between the monetary authority and the ﬁscal treasuries
is prevented by the institutional rules to be followed: “We do know that [the
ECB] is not going to pay much attention to ﬁscal policy or to ﬁscal-monetary
co-ordination” (Hughes Hallet, 2001, p. 11).
The observation made by Hughes Hallet might suggest that it does not
make any sense to consider a strategic relationship between the ECB and
the national treasuries simply because the ECB Statute does not contain any
element allowing to infer that monetary policy would be more expansionary
when ﬁscal policy becomes tight enough. Such a condition, however, is not
present in the Fed’s Statute either, but the available evidence provides a
clear indication of such a strategic relationship, as we have argued above.
Moreover, “the aggregate ﬁscal stance deserves special attention in the EMU
context, since it directly aﬀects the policy-mix at the European level, and
therefore is one of the elements taken into account in setting monetary policy”
(European Economy, 2001, p. 19).
This point of view is strengthened when considering the declarations,
reminiscent of the strategic relationship between the Fed and the Treasury
in the US, that a couple of years ago accompanied the interest rate reductions
by the ECB: “I think that we are credible enough for people to believe that
we will deliver what we promise to deliver. And now it is the turn of the
governments to do the same thing” (Duisenberg, 5 June 2003, ECB Press
Conference).
In the following paragraph we present the model by which we intend
to analyse the strategic interaction between the ECB and national ﬁscal
authorities in Europe.
4 The model
We consider a monetary union formed by two countries. In each country
the ﬁscal authority is responsible for ﬁscal policy, represented by the gov-
views underlying that central banks, engaged in contractionary policies aimed at reducing
the inﬂation rate, were slow and reluctant to compensate for the consolidation policies
followed by ﬁscal authorities.
8ernment surplus/GNP ratio17, Si, where subscript i = 1,2 refers to country
1 and 2 respectively. The union’s central bank is responsible for monetary
policy, conducted by setting interest rate, r. The model is a single-period
one. The inﬂation-unemployment trade oﬀ is represented by a standard
short-run Phillips curve, as in eq. (1), where p and pe are the union’s actual
and expected inﬂation rate, respectively; ui and
−
ui is the actual and natural
unemployment rate in country i, respectively; δ and ε are the parameters in-
dicating the weight of country 1 and country 2, respectively, in the monetary

















Following Nordhaus (1994), we assume that the expected inﬂation rate
is given by a backward looking component, pB, i. e. past inﬂation, and a
forward looking one, p, i.e. actual inﬂation:
p
e = ωp + (1 − ω)p
B, (2)
where ω is a parameter expressing the weight of the forward looking
component18. By substituting from eq. (2) into eq. (1), for 0 ≤ ω < 1, we
obtain:
p = −α(δu1 + εu2) + k, (3)
where α = − α0










Monetary and ﬁscal policies are assumed to aﬀect aggregate demand and
unemployment, as shown in eqs. (4) and (5)20:
u1 = µ1S1 + ν2S2 + µrr (4)
u2 = µ2S2 + ν1S1 + µrr, (5)
where µ1and ν2 are the multipliers of u1 with respect to S1 and S2; µ2 and ν1
are the multipliers of u2 with respect to S2 and S1; and µr is the multiplier
of both u1 and u2 with respect to r.
17For the choice of this (structural) ﬁscal surplus ratio see Nordhaus (1994).
18This formulation encompasses the new classical case for ω = 1.
19In the new classical case, with ω = 1, the actual unemployment rate is equal to the
natural one.
20In the new classical case, instead, unemployment is unaﬀected by monetary and ﬁscal
policy in the absence of shocks.
9By substituting eqs. (4) and (5) into eq. (3), one gets21:
p = −α[δ (µ1 + ν1)S1 + ε(µ2 + ν2)S2 + 2µrr] + k. (6)
Authorities are assumed to target unemployment, inﬂation and government
surplus. Their loss functions are assumed to be quadratic and separable:
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M = (δu1 + εu2 − u
∗∗)
2 + β
∗∗ (p − p
∗∗)
2 + γ
∗∗ (δS1 + εS2 − S
∗∗)
2 , (9)
where β and γ are parameters, the superscripts M,F1 and F2 have obvious
meanings, and the superscript ∗ (∗∗) of a variable denotes the target value
for the ﬁscal (monetary) authorities22.
4.1 The reaction functions
We can now derive the reaction functions for the monetary and ﬁscal author-
ities.
The reaction function of the monetary authority is obtained by substi-
tuting into eq. (9) from eqs. (1)-(5), by diﬀerentiating with respect to r and
by imposing the optimality condition
∂LM










(δµ1 + εν1)(1 + α2β
∗∗)
. (10)
As for the ﬁscal authority of country 1, by substituting into eq. (7) from
eqs. (1)-(5) and by setting
∂LF1






































21In the new classical case inﬂation is not linked to unemployment in the absence of
shocks.
22Target unemployment can be diﬀerent from the natural rate, as, for instance, in the
case of monopolistic competition (see Dixit and Lambertini, 2001).
10By substituting into eq. (8) from eqs. (1)-(5) and by setting
∂LF2
∂S2 = 0,




































This is a three-player game that we need to simplify in order to obtain
easily interpretable results. There are two simple ways for doing this. The
ﬁrst alternative consists in introducing the assumption of perfect symmetry
between the two countries, that are thus considered to be mirror images.
This is the device we use in this section. The second one, instead, is based on
the hypothesis of a strong asymmetry between the two union members, one
being a large country, the other a small one. This allows to consider the game
between a single country and the central bank. From the perspective of the
large country, since the variables and behavior of the small one are virtually
irrelevant, the game resembles that of a closed economy, as in Nordhaus
(1994). We analyse instead the game between a small country and the union’s
central bank in section 4.323.
4.2 Mirror image countries
Let us consider the case of the two union member countries being mirror
images, which implies:




23Note that in the new classical case, since monetary and ﬁscal policy do not aﬀect the
unemployment rate, eq. (4), eq. (5) and eq. (6) are replaced by:






Since unemployment is predetermined, its coeﬃcient can be set to zero in the utility
function. Solving the utility functions with these new conditions yields that p = p∗∗ for
the monetary authority, i.e. monetary authority determines the inﬂation rate. If p∗ = p∗∗,
then S = S∗: the ﬁscal authority determines the surplus and the outcome is eﬃcient.
This result reproduces the one by Nordhaus (1994); Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) obtain
a similar result, named ”symbiosis” of monetary and ﬁscal policies: if ﬁscal and monetary
authorities agree about the inﬂation and output targets, these are obtained even with
diﬀerent weights of the objectives in their respective utility functions.
114.2.1 The case of non co-operative ﬁscal authorities
As for the monetary authority, by using the assumptions above and by set-
ting, without loss of generality, (µs + νs) = 1, u =
u1+u2
2 and p∗∗ = −αu+++k
(for the last assumption see Nordhaus, 1994), eq. (10) becomes:





Since we assume that the two countries are symmetric, we set S1 = S2 =
S, which yields:





which is the reaction function for the monetary authority.
As for the ﬁscal authority, by applying the restrictions above to eq. (11),
and by setting p∗
1 = −αu
+






































which is the reaction function for the ﬁscal authority of country 1; symmet-






































Recalling our assumption that the two countries are mirror images so













12The coordinates of the Nash equilibrium (NN) are obtained by consid-

















































Fiscal leadership generates a result that is Pareto superior to the Nash
one, corresponding to a less expansionary monetary stance. Minimizing eq.
(7) subject to the constraint of the monetary authority reaction function, eq.












The result is similar to the one obtained in Nordhaus (1994) for a closed
economy and in Dixit and Luisa Lambertini (2001) for a monetary union.
Fig. 1 represents the situations described above.
4.2.2 The case of co-operative ﬁscal authorities
After considering the case in which the two ﬁscal authorities act non co-
operatively, let us consider the case in which they do co-operate. In such a
situation they minimise the following joint loss function:
L
F = (u − u
∗)
2 + β
∗ (p − p
∗)
2 + γ
∗ (S − S
∗)
2 . (22)
By applying the procedure above and by setting
∂LF
∂S = 0, one obtains the
























13Figure 1: The Nash equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium with ﬁscal
leadership with a negatively sloped central bank’s reaction function (mirror
image countries)
where SC indicates the ﬁscal authorities’ optimal surplus response.
Note that the slope of the ﬁscal authority’s reaction function in the co-
operative case is higher, in absolute value, than in the non co-operative one,
since the eﬀect of a change in r on the other country is also taken into
account. The monetary authority’s reaction function, instead, remains the
same as in the non co-operative case and is always steeper than the ﬁscal
one. This is deﬁnitely true if νs > 0, which is the case in this two-country
setup.
The coordinates of the Nash equilibrium when the ﬁscal authorities do
co-operate with each other (CN) are obtained by solving the system formed
















































As for the Stackelberg equilibrium, it is easy to show that the result is
analogous to that obtained in the non co-operative case.
144.2.3 The bliss points
The positions of the bliss points depend upon all parameters. In coherence
with our initial assumptions, let us consider the case analysed by Nordhaus
(1994). For simplicity, let us assume that the ﬁscal and monetary authorities’
utility functions display equal parameters, except u∗∗ > u∗. By evaluating

































rBF, rBFc and rBM indicate, for a given S∗, the level of r at the bliss point
for the ﬁscal authority in the non co-operative and in the co-operative case
and for the monetary authority, respectively. The interest rate level depends
on the value of the parameters appearing in the equation. For instance, other
things being equal, it will be the higher, the higher the unemployment target
and its weight in the loss function.




























a higher target for unemployment for the central bank determining a higher
level of the interest rate.
In the case of co-operative ﬁscal authorities, the diﬀerence rBM− rBFc is
equal to 1
(1+α2β∗)µr (u∗∗ − u∗); this is still positive, and its size with respect
to the previous case depends upon the magnitude of µs: it is smaller than
the diﬀerence rBM− rBF if µs > 0,5, while the bliss points coincide if µs =
0,5. Recall that, given the assumption (µs + νs) = 1, this is equivalent to
saying that the bliss points of the ﬁscal and monetary authorities are closer
to each other in the co-operative case than in the non co-operative one if
15µs > νs, while they coincide if µs = νs. Therefore, if the two countries co-
operate with each other, co-operation with the central bank is more easily
achieved. However, in the lack of co-operation with the central bank, the
co-operation between the ﬁscal authorities leads to a Nash equilibrium in the
game played with the monetary authority implying a lower welfare level than
that obtained when the ﬁscal authorities do not co-operate with each other.
This situation is represented in Fig. 2, that shows the reaction functions
for the case S∗ = S∗∗ = 0 and for µs = νs
24. Given the coordinates of the
bliss points for the ﬁscal and the monetary authority (BF and BM) and the
slopes of their reaction functions, it is evident that the NN equilibrium lies
closer to the bliss points than the CN one, the latter being characterised by
a higher level of both the interest rate and the government deﬁcit.
Figure 2: Nash equilibrium in the co-operative (CN) and non co-operative
(NN) case.
4.2.4 Discussion of the results in the case of mirror image coun-
tries
The explanation of the result according to which, in the lack of co-operation
with the central bank, it is preferable that ﬁscal authorities do not co-operate
24We keep considering the Nordhaus case in which the monetary authority is more
concerned with price stability than employment; the opposite is true for the ﬁscal authority.
16between themselves either, lies in the fact that the externalities imposed by
each country both on the other one and on the monetary authority partially
oﬀset each other. In fact, if they do not co-operate, each ﬁscal authority
does not take into account the positive eﬀect of its action on the employment
level in the other union member; therefore, the use of the ﬁscal instrument
would be smaller than optimal. At the same time, the negative eﬀect on the
central bank’s objective function is also disregarded, which would yield a too
large ﬁscal operation. Being of opposite sign, the two external eﬀects tend
to oﬀset each other. If the ﬁscal authorities do co-operate, instead, a joint
loss function is being minimised, with the internalization of the eﬀect of a
ﬁscal action on the other country. As a result, the ﬁscal authorities’ reaction
function becomes steeper and the Nash equilibrium implies both a higher
budget deﬁcit and a higher interest rate, since the monetary authority follows
a more restrictive monetary stance in response to the more expansionary
ﬁscal policy. Only a lack of co-operation between the two ﬁscal authorities,
resulting in a lower ﬁscal expansion, would allow the central bank not to
react25.
In accordance with the result obtained by Nordhaus (1994), in the closed
economy, co-operation between the monetary authority and both ﬁscal au-
thorities, instead, allows to reach a point on the contract curve, characterised
by a higher S and a lower r, compared to the case above. In fact, as we have
already seen, the non co-operative equilibrium is characterised by a lower
S and a higher r than desired by either authority because of the conﬂict
between their respective objectives: when the ﬁscal authority increases the
deﬁcit to support employment, it causes a rise in the inﬂation rate; thus, the
central bank reacts by raising r, which increases unemployment. A corollary
of this result is that economies with independent central banks (implying
non co-operation between central bank and ﬁscal authorities) will normally
face higher interest rates.
Moreover, ﬁscal leadership would lead to an outcome that is superior to
the Nash one, corresponding to a more restrictive ﬁscal stance, as in Nordhaus
(1994). However, in section 4.3 we show how the perspective changes in the
case of a small union member country.
These results allow us to interpret the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability
and Growth Pact in the light of our model. We can translate their clauses
into two elements: a) the central bank is obliged to pursue price stability,
which can most easily be represented by a low level of p∗∗ (alternatively, or
25The result that no co-operation at all is preferable to co-operation between some
players only is found in several papers on international policy coordination, starting from
Rogoﬀ (1985).
17in addition to this, by a high value of β
∗∗); this induces a rightward shift
of the monetary authority’s reaction function, making the Nash equilibrium
correspond to a higher r and a lower S and the bliss points more distant from
each other with respect to the case analysed before (Fig. 3); this would seem
to increase the diﬃculty of co-operating, the bliss points of the two authorities
being further apart. However, in this case it is also more likely that, for either
authority, the opponent’s bliss point allows to reach an indiﬀerence curve
that is higher than in the Nash case. b) A limit to the level of the deﬁcit,
as contemplated in the Maastricht Treaty and in the Stability and Growth
Pact, would allow to reach a position that is superior to NN. The ﬁscal
authority’s reaction function would become horizontal when reaching it and
the new equilibrium would be given by point M in Fig. 3 (r would be higher
if also element a) is taken into account - see point M0). Two polar cases
would be as follows: i) the central bank chooses this threshold at S∗∗, thus
obtaining its bliss (imperialistic solution); ii) since the ﬁscal authorities might
not be able to play Stackelberg for the reasons explained above (myopia and
impatience), the threshhold is determined by an outside institution in such
a way as to reach such an equilibrium.
Figure 3: Eﬀects of the Stability and Growth Pact
The scenarios sub a) and b) correspond to two alternative interpretations
of the Stability and Growth Pact. The ﬁrst one is centered on the role of the
European central bank as the guardian of price stability, according to the
18clauses of the Maastricht Treaty. In this view, ﬁscal discipline reinforces the
no bail out clause defending against the risks of an opportunistic behavior of
the ﬁscal authorities. The problem with this attitude is that it ends up with
a too restrictive monetary policy.
Alternatively, the limits to government deﬁcit and debt levels can be
interpreted as a pre-requirement for a more growth oriented monetary policy.
Debt ﬁnanced ﬁscal expansions aimed at supporting aggregate demand raise
inﬂation, thus making the central bank increase the interest rate. This would
hinder the possibility to expand employment. Conversely, less expansionary
ﬁscal policies would make it possible for the monetary authority to pursue
growth oriented policies, according to the discussion presented in section 3.
The case for the imposition of ﬁscal rules is reinforced if one considers
the role played by the number of ﬁscal authorities in the decision on deﬁcit
reduction. If the outcome of the game played by a single monetary authority
with several ﬁscal authorities is much worse than the one resulting from a
game played by a central bank and a single treasury, the imposition of strict
ﬁscal rules might be necessary in order to move the economy out of a Pareto
ineﬃcient situation, or as a way to impose a co-ordinated action on otherwise
short-sighted treasuries (see next section).
4.3 The small country case
A further argument for the introduction of ﬁscal rules can be found when
considering a Stackelberg game with ﬁscal leadership in which each ﬁscal
authority plays separately against the central bank. In Nordhaus’ case (and
in Dixit and Luisa Lambertini, 2001) such a game would produce a more re-
strictive ﬁscal stance, since the single ﬁscal authority optimises by taking into
account the monetary authority’s reaction function rather than action. In
the presence of several ﬁscal authorities, however, each of them is aware that
the monetary authority would react in a limited way to a ﬁscal consolidation
undertaken by just one country: the monetary authority would only react to
a co-ordinated ﬁscal restriction inducing an overall ﬁscal adjustment. Thus,
each single country, especially if small, might face a very steep central bank’s
reaction function. The latter, in fact, does not directly react to the national
ﬁscal policy stance, but to changes in inﬂation and unemployment of the
whole union. With respect to these variables, however, the single country’s
ﬁscal policy operation can be of little relevance (the number of countries, or
better, the country economic dimension turns out to be of central importance
19in this context)26.
In the limiting case, then, the monetary authority will not react to
changes in the single country’s ﬁscal stance. Thus, it becomes impossible for
the single ﬁscal authority to improve its welfare level by moving away from
the Nash equilibrium acting as a leader, since it faces a vertical monetary
authority’s reaction function (going through the Nash equilibrium point). In
this case, the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria coincide, given that the in-
diﬀerence curve of the ﬁscal authority is tangent to the vertical monetary
authority’s reaction function exactly where the latter meets the ﬁscal au-
thority’s reaction function.
This situation can be analysed within the general model presented above
by imposing the following restrictions: µ1 is small with respect to ν2 and µr;
δ → 0, ε → 1 and ν1 = 0. These assumptions imply that the ﬁscal stance of
the large country can be taken as given. The hypothesis can be justiﬁed in
the limiting case of a country that is so small with respect to the rest of the
union that it cannot inﬂuence the unemployment rate of the whole area by
using its instrument, so that the rest of the union will not react to changes
in its ﬁscal position.
In order to obtain the Nash equilibrium in the game between the small
country and the central bank we need to determine the monetary and ﬁscal
authorities’ reaction functions. For the case in which p∗∗ = −αu++ + k, the
former is obtained by imposing the above mentioned restrictions to eq. (10),





























Given that S2 is independent of S1, since the ﬁscal authority in the large
country is not inﬂuenced by what takes place in the small one (i.e., ν1 = 0),
country 1 can take such value as exogenous, so that by considering eq. (30)
we would conclude that r =
−
r. More precisely, by applying the restrictions
described above to eq. (12) and by letting p∗ = −αu∗
2 + k, we have the
following expression for the reaction function of country 2:
26For the political implications of the participation of small countries to the EMU (Bel-





















































The same operation can be done for the case in which the small country
incorporates the large country’s ﬁscal action into its reaction function rather
than taking it as given. By substituting eq. (32) into eq. (31) we obtain:
S1 = −



































The value of S1 at the Nash equilibrium point is found by substituting
r =
−
r into the equation above.
As for the Stackelberg equilibrium, the solution is found by minimizing
eq. (7) with respect to S1 subject to the restrictions for the small country
case and to the constraint r =
−
r, which yields the same result as in the Nash
case.
Fig. 1 showed a negatively sloped monetary authority’s reaction function.
In that case, as in Nordhaus (1994), moving from a Nash to a Stackelberg
equilibrium allows a Pareto improvement. On the contrary, in the case we are
considering now, a ﬁscal consolidation would not generate an interest rate
reduction, since the reaction function is vertical (or almost vertical): only
in the presence of co-ordinated ﬁscal operations in both countries, a ﬁscal
consolidation undertaken by one country will be accompanied by a similar
policy of the other one, thus producing an overall increase in the ﬁscal sur-
plus and inducing a response from the monetary authority. With a vertical
reaction function faced by the small country, instead, a ﬁscal consolidation
would not produce any interest rate reduction, so that the Nash and Stack-
elberg equilibria coincide (see Fig. 4). It should be observed, therefore, that
in the small country case, in the absence of co-ordination between the two
ﬁscal authorities, the result obtained by Lambertini and Rovelli (2003) does
not hold any more: the Stackelberg solution is not superior to the Nash one.
21Figure 4: The Nash equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium with ﬁscal
leadership with a vertical central bank’s reaction function (small country
case)
4.3.1 Discussion of the results in the small country case
In the preceding section we have shown that the central bank does not react
to the operations undertaken by a small country. This suggests the conclusion
that, in a monetary union formed by several small countries, each of them
will face a vertical central bank’s reaction function, so that none of them will
have the incentive to pursue ﬁscal discipline.
This conclusion, however, might get modiﬁed in the case of symmetric
countries as assumed in section 4.2: if each of the small countries follows the
same action, then the central bank will react to the common ﬁscal opera-
tion. In other words, the monetary authority’s reaction function will tend to
become ﬂatter with respect to the original vertical slope.
One can thus consider two diﬀerent possible equilibria. The ﬁrst one is
characterised by the absence of co-ordination between the ﬁscal authorities
of the small countries and obtains if they either ignore the reactions of their
partners, taking their actions as given, or know that they will not modify
their ﬁscal stance. The second equilibrium, instead, obtains when ﬁscal au-
thorities co-ordinate their decisions, aware of the fact that the central bank
will respond to a co-ordinated ﬁscal consolidation.
As we know already, a non co-operative equilibrium between two ﬁscal
authorities (when they also do not co-operate with the monetary authority)
is Pareto superior to a co-operative one. While co-operation between the two
ﬁscal authorities worsens the outcome, however, co-ordination between them
22would improve it27, since a simultaneous decision of the two ﬁscal authorities
to move in the same direction modiﬁes the monetary authority’s reaction
function, so as to allow its response28.
Following our previous arguments, the ﬁscal rules introduced by the Maas-
tricht Treaty ﬁnd a clear justiﬁcation in the lack of incentive for each single
ﬁscal authority to operate in a restrictive way. In other words, rules oper-
ate as a substitute for co-ordination since the two ﬁscal authorities might
get locked in their initial sub-optimal equilibrium and might not be able to
co-ordinate on the “restricts/restricts” equilibrium.
To summarise:
1) The consolidation eﬀort of a ﬁscal authority might be reduced (or
even prevented) by the fear that the monetary authority may not respond
in an expansionary way to a ﬁscal restriction, thereby causing a recession.
This would certainly be the case if the central bank were obliged to follow a
ﬁxed interest rate rule. In such a case, it could not interact with the ﬁscal
authority(ies) in response to a ﬁscal adjustment (see Hughes Hallet, 2001).
Such an outcome might also result as a consequence of a particular belief by
the central bank, for example that inﬂation is only determined by money:
in such an instance, the monetary authority would not respond to a ﬁscal
contraction simply because it does not believe that such a contraction may
reduce inﬂation.
2) The same outcome obtains when the ﬁscal authority fears that the
monetary authority’s reaction may be slow. This outcome would arise with
a rather conservative central bank that would need to observe a low inﬂation
before agreeing on reducing the interest rate. This point is made extensively
by Nordhaus (1994). He shows how a deﬁcit reduction will be very costly in
terms of lower aggregate demand and higher unemployment, when monetary
policy is “results-oriented” and responds to a ﬁscal consolidation with a delay.
3) The lack of ﬁscal consolidation, however, might also emerge in a large
union, when each single ﬁscal authority knows that its behaviour does not
aﬀect the interest rate choice made by the central bank. This is the point
we make in this paper. The larger the number of countries, the lower the
incentive to reduce the ﬁscal deﬁcit, diﬀerently from what happens in the US.
27It should be underlined that ﬁscal co-ordination among European countries is strongly
advocated in the Maastricht Treaty.
28The diﬀerence between co-ordination and co-operation is rather subtle and far from
univocally accepted (see, for example, Moslechner and Schuerz, 2001). In this paper we
refer to co-operation between two players when they optimise a weighted average of their
opponent’s and of their own utility functions. We refer to co-ordination when, in presence
of multiple equilibria, two players that might end up in the sub-optimal one manage to
move to the Pareto superior outcome.
23A result which is similar to that obtained when one monetary authority faces
one ﬁscal authority might be reached if separate ﬁscal authorities manage to
co-ordinate their policies, rather than co-operate. Since such a co-ordination
seems diﬃcult to achieve, however, the imposition of ﬁscal rules is justiﬁed.
The imposition of the Maastricht criteria might have also made it common
knowledge that everybody will behave in the same way, thereby eliminating
the co-ordination problem. The monetary authority will thus be able to
respond to the ﬁscal authorities of the union as if they were a single ﬁscal
authority, like in the US case.
The imposition of ﬁscal rules ﬁnds a further justiﬁcation when considering
that the ﬁscal authorities may have no incentives to run restrictive policies if
the monetary authority has a very limited room for monetary accomodation,
as it is the case in the current European context, characterised by low interest
rates and a relative expansionary monetary policy. It could be objected
that while our paper proves that the incentive to run expansionary policies
should be higher for small than for large countries, the opposite is observed
in reality. The reason for such and apparent contradiction lies in the fact
that the institutional European reality is characterised by the imposition of
ﬁscal rules that apply asymmetrically to European countries. While small
countries perceive them as eﬀective and binding, large ones, due to their
high voting power, may substantially ignore them. Such a situation can be
represented in our model by letting the parameter expressing the cost of ﬁscal
convergence from a given target, γ∗, tend to inﬁnity for small countries, while
letting it be very low for large ones.
5 Concluding remarks
A standard result in the literature on monetary and ﬁscal policy co-ordination
is that non co-operative monetary and ﬁscal policies lead to excessive deﬁcit
spending and too high interest rates. When considering a monetary union,
characterised by the presence of several ﬁscal authorities, in the lack of co-
operation with the central bank the same result obtains even if the treasuries
co-operate with each other. A better outcome is obtained, instead, when, in
the lack of co-operation with the central bank, there is no co-operation among
themselves either. Fiscal rules, such as those contemplated in the Maastricht
Treaty and in the Stability and Growth Pact, can be welfare improving if
lower deﬁcit/higher surpluses are accompanied by a more expansionary mon-
etary policy. This is in line with the interpretation of the ﬁscal requirements
as a condition for a growth oriented monetary policy. Another reason for
enhancing ﬁscal rules is that, in the presence of a large number of countries,
24ﬁscal leadership, which would be welfare increasing in a one-country set up,
becomes impossible if national treasuries do not act in coordination with
each other, so that the central bank will not respond to the behaviour of a
single ﬁscal authority.
It is worth observing that, contrary to Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999),
our conclusions do not depend on Central bank’s ability to commit to low
inﬂation. The result obtained by van Aarle, Bovenberg and Raith (1997)
is symmetric to our own, in that the central bank does not react to a ﬁs-
cal adjustment undertaken by a single ﬁscal authority, since such a limited
adjustment will not be enough to reduce the union’s aggregate demand and
inﬂation rate. In their paper, then, when the number of players in the EMU
increases, the strategic power of the Central bank also increases. Such an
observation can be reinterpreted in our model, in the sense that, when the
number of ﬁscal players increases, there will be less incentive for ﬁscal dis-
cipline, since the ECB will not reduce interest rates when a single ﬁscal
authority contracts and will not raise them when it expands.
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